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ABSTRACT 
 
Power struggles between government branches are nothing new. What is 
new is how those struggles have recently changed in the United Kingdom as 
a result of the constitutional reforms enacted by Tony Blair and the Labour 
Party. In addition to incorporating fundamental human rights into the British 
legal system, the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 resulted in the 
alteration of the balance of power between the three British government 
branches, with the judiciary and legislature achieving substantial gains in 
influence and independence. An unintentional side-effect of these changes 
is that the British government structure now appears to have a more 
American style with a stronger separation of powers. More specifically, the 
British legislature and judiciary have gained new powers when human 
rights laws are implicated, which place these branches on more equal 
footing with the traditionally dominant executive branch. As this article 
shows, when creating or altering laws that involve human rights, 
government branch interactions are noticeably different, and the legislature 
and judiciary now have more of an impact on which laws will stand the test 
of time. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Legal and political science scholars have long recognized that political 
actors, including government branches, have policy goals and will try to 
advance those goals when creating law.1 To do so, these actors engage in 
strategic actions or gamesmanship, which can be seen in the interactions 
between the government branches in the creation of constitutional and other 
types of law.2 Scholars have studied these interactions for decades and have 
resulted in the invention of a variety of constitutional theories about how 
government branches work together (or against each other) to create law.3 
To put it simply, according to these scholars, each government branch has a 
preference for what a certain law will say and each branch will act 
strategically to ensure that the enacted law closely matches its preference.4 
  
 1. See, e.g., James R. Rogers, Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling Game 
of Legislative Judicial Interaction, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 84, 84 (2001); see also Daniel E. 
Ingberman & Dennis A. Yao, Presidential Commitment and the Veto, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
357, 357 (1991); see also Pablo T. Spiller & Rafael Gely, Strategic Judicial Decisionmaking 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13321, 2007). 
 2. Some of the more dramatic versions of these strategies, which can lead to 
fundamental constitutional changes, have been called “constitutional hardball” by Mark 
Tushnet and “constitutional showdowns” by Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule. Mark V. 
Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523, 528-29 (2004); Eric A. 
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991, 997 (2008).  
 3. These theories are commonly called rational choice, public choice, or positive 
political theories. Morris P. Fiorina, Rational Choice, Empiric Contributions, and the 
Scientific Enterprise, in THE RATIONAL CHOICE CONTROVERSY 87, 97 (Jeffrey Friedman ed., 
1996). Theorists appear to use these theory titles interchangeably. See, e.g., William Riker, 
Political Science and Rational Choice, in PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
173 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990).  
 4. See McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J. 
L. ECON. & ORG., Mar. 180, 181 (1999); see also John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, A 
Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 263, 269-70 (1992).  
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The strategies include anticipating the other branches’ policy preferences 
and drafting legislation that is close enough to their preferences to provide 
disincentive for the other branches to bother overriding the law.5 
For government branches to be able to behave strategically with each 
other, they arguably must be separate and equal in their powers.6 The 
United States therefore presents a useful starting point from which to study 
these kinds of strategic government interactions. In contrast, the British 
parliamentary system has historically deemphasized the doctrine of 
separation of powers and has been dominated by the executive branch.7 
However, recent constitutional changes have brought the British 
government structure closer to that of the United States, with stronger 
separation of powers and increased power for both the legislature and the 
judiciary, particularly in the area of human rights law. More specifically, the 
Human Rights Act 1998 has given Parliament greater oversight over bills 
introduced by the executive, and it has given the judiciary the ability to 
creatively interpret statutes and issue non-binding Declarations of 
Incompatibility when a statute is in conflict with human rights law. These 
new powers put all of the government branches on more equal footing. 
Therefore, the British government actors can now strategize with each other 
when creating human rights laws just as their American counterparts do.  
In Part I, this article examines how the British government branches have 
historically interacted and how those interactions have changed with the 
enactment of the Human Rights Act. This article then analyzes the potential 
political strategies each branch can use when creating law, with an emphasis 
on the difference between the American and British government structures 
and strategies. In Part II, Charts will be used to show how the different 
British government branches strategize when interacting with each other 
and how those strategies will differ when human rights legislation is 
involved.  
I. THE INTERACTIONS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM’S THREE GOVERNMENT 
BRANCHES 
The United Kingdom’s constitutional history is in stark contrast to the 
circumstances surrounding the creation of the United States Constitution. 
There is no codified British constitution that was drafted in response to the 
  
 5. Andrew D. Martin, Congressional Decision Making and the Separation of 
Powers, 95 AM. POL. SCI. R. 361, 376 (2001).  
 6. See, e.g., Tonja Jacobi, The Impact of Positive Political Theory on Old Questions 
of Constitutional Law and the Separation of Powers, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 259, 260-61 (2006). 
Indeed, these studies of the interactions of American government branches are often called 
“Separation of Powers (SOP) studies.” Luke M. Milligan, Congressional End-Run: The 
Ignored Constraint on Judicial Review, 45 GA. L. REV. 211, 229 (2010). 
 7. R. M. PUNNETT, BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 175 (5th ed. 1987). 
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revolutionary creation of a new nation.8 Instead, the United Kingdom’s 
constitution and government structure have developed in a gradual and 
piecemeal fashion that is altered whenever the United Kingdom decides it 
needs to change.9 Because there was no deliberate attempt to create a British 
government, the three branches were also left to develop on their own, and 
there was no explicit attempt to separate their functions.10 The United 
Kingdom’s three branches of government are, therefore, more integrated, 
with members of one branch often participating in another.11 For example, 
in order to be part of the executive branch—the Prime Minister and his or 
her cabinet12—a person must also be part of the legislative branch by being 
either a member of the House of Commons or the House of Lords.13 Indeed, 
only the party with the majority of members in the House of Commons is 
permitted to form the executive branch.14 
Comparative studies that have analyzed the United Kingdom or another 
parliamentary style government have given little attention to its different 
government structure when predicting government strategic action.15 More 
in-depth studies of the British government or those studies done by British 
scholars have focused on particular sections of British politics such as 
political party dominance,16 local government competition,17 and the effects 
of government regulation and interest groups on land use planning.18 
Scholars have also examined some aspects of the United Kingdom’s 
government structure and processes, such as cabinet reshuffles,19 multi-
  
 8. PETER LEYLAND, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM: A CONTEXTUAL 
ANALYSIS 9 (2007).  
 9. Id. at 16.  
 10. Id. at 54-55. 
 11. Id. at 55.  
 12. MALCOLM WALLES, BRITISH AND AMERICAN SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT 78 
(1988). The British Monarch is also part of the executive but his or her role is primarily 
ceremonial. Although the Monarch does retain many prerogative powers, modern 
conventions have all removed his or her ability to actually affect the actions of the 
government. Id. Consequently, this article will not be discussing the impact of the Monarch. 
 13. LEYLAND, supra note 8, at 86. 
 14. DAWN OLIVER, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN THE UK 8 (2003).  
 15. For example, in a discussion on the different models of executive and legislative 
relationships, parliamentary models were given only the briefest discussion, whereas the 
United States model and those of South American presidentialismo systems were analyzed in 
much greater depth. See Barry Weingast, Rational-Choice Institutionalism, in POLITICAL 
SCIENCE: STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 660, 666 (Ira Katznelson & Helen V. Milner eds., 2002).  
 16. See Robert D. Cooter & Tom Ginsburg, Comparative Judicial Discretion: An 
Empirical Test of Economic Models, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 295, 297 (1996).  
 17. See generally George A BOYNE, PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE UK AND THE USA (1998). 
 18. See generally Mark PENNINGTON, PLANNING AND THE POLITICAL MARKET: PUBLIC 
CHOICE AND THE POLITICS OF GOVERNMENT FAILURE (2000). 
 19. See Indridi H. Indridason & Christopher Kam, Cabinet Reshuffles and 
Ministerial Drift, 38 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 621, 622 (2008).  
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party systems,20 and voting,21 but have not fully explained how the British 
government branches interact to create laws.  
Moreover, unlike the United States, there is no system in the United 
Kingdom that ensures that all three branches have enough power to oppose 
the other branches.22 Although the United Kingdom does differentiate 
between the three branches of government, the United Kingdom does not 
have a fully developed system of checks and balances. In theory, the Prime 
Minister and his or her cabinet (the executive) can impose their will upon 
Parliament (the legislature) through a strong party system.23 In turn, 
Parliament can impose its will upon the judiciary through the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty.24  
In contrast to what occurs in Congress, Members of the House of 
Commons virtually always vote along party lines.25 If they vote against their 
party, they can expect to not receive party support in the next election and 
may well lose their seat in Parliament.26 Because the executive is from the 
political party with a majority of seats in the House of Commons, a strong 
and popular executive branch can normally push through almost any 
legislation it likes. The executive branch’s fellow political party members, 
whom, by definition, have the majority in the Commons, will usually ensure 
that the executive’s legislation is passed.27 
Once legislation is passed, the executive can also rely upon the judiciary 
to defer to Parliament when interpreting the legislation.28 Although it is the 
executive that actually proposes and compels the passage of most 
legislation, the judiciary uses the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty to 
  
 20. See Gilat Levy, A Model of Political Parties, 115 J. ECON. THEORY 250, 257 
(2004); see also Daniel Diermeier & Timothy J. Federsen, Cohesion in Legislatures and the 
Vote of Confidence Procedure, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 611 (1998).  
 21. See generally DAVID ROBERTSON, CLASS AND THE BRITISH ELECTORATE (1984); 
see e.g., David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey Banks, Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative 
Outcomes, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 405, 405-22 (1988); see e.g., Valentino Larcinese, 
Electoral Competition and Redistribution with Rationally Informed Voters, 4 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECON. ANALYSIS & POL. 1, 1-28 (2005).  
 22. J.A.G. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY xvii (5th ed. 1997).  
 23. See DUNCAN WATTS, UNDERSTANDING US/UK GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS: A 
COMPARATIVE GUIDE 40, 120 (2d ed. 2008).  
 24. Id.; LEYLAND, supra note 8, at 36. 
 25. LEYLAND, supra note 8, at 87. The power of party affiliation may be lessening 
with the increased use of social media. Michael White, G2: Our Politicians are Revolting!: 
Believe it or not, this Parliament is the Most Rebellious yet. Michael White Explains why 
Twitter, Rolling News and Coalition angst mean the Modern Backbencher is far more Likely 
to Defy the Whip, GUARDIAN, May 29, 2012, at 6.  
 26. LEYLAND, supra note 8, at 87.  
 27. OLIVER, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN THE UK, supra note 14, at 8. There are 
exceptions to this scenario, such as when there is a Coalition Government where two or more 
parties share the majority of members of the House of Commons. Unpopular Prime Ministers 
may also face opposition from their own party members, particularly for controversial 
legislation. 
 28. Id. at 29. 
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effect the will of Parliament.29 The judiciary will therefore invariably limit 
itself to the text of the legislation when determining how it should apply to a 
certain case. Accordingly, the executive can dominate both the legislative 
and judicial branches of the British government. However, recent 
constitutional changes have given the British government a stronger 
separation of powers with more co-equal government branches.30 Since the 
passage of the Human Rights Act, the executive branch’s reach has become 
limited when its legislation affects human rights. 
A. Constitutional Impact of the Human Rights Act 
After the Labour Party came to power in the United Kingdom in 1997, it 
began to implement the vast constitutional changes it promised in its 
election manifesto.31 By relying on its popular support, the Labour Party 
was able to quickly implement a variety of constitutional changes, such as 
devolution of government powers to Wales and Scotland, and increased 
human rights protections.32 More specifically, the enactment of the Human 
Rights Act has dramatically affected the United Kingdom’s human rights 
laws and constitutional structure.  
The Human Rights Act’s primary purpose is to incorporate the rights 
contained in the European Convention on Human Rights into British law so 
that those rights are now enforceable in British courts.33 The Human Rights 
Act has altered the entire concept of “rights” within the United Kingdom by 
changing it from a negative system with “presumptions of liberty” to one 
where rights are actively enforced by all three branches of government.34 
Changing how rights are viewed has not been an easy transition for the 
United Kingdom. Prior to the Human Rights Act, the European Convention 
on Human Rights was unpopular in the United Kingdom because it was 
  
 29. Douglas W. Vick, The Human Rights Act and the British Constitution, 37 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 329, 338 (2002); LEYLAND, supra note 8, at 38-39.  
 30. As shown below, one of the main pieces of legislation that introduced these 
changes is the Human Rights Act 1998. 
 31. Lord Lester, The Art of the Possible—Interpreting Statutes Under the Human 
Rights Act, EUR. H.R. L. REV. 665, 668 (1998); FRANCESCA KLUG, VALUES FOR A GODLESS 
AGE: THE STORY OF THE UK’S NEW BILL OF RIGHTS 62 (2000); Britain Will Be Better with 
New Labour, ARCHIVE OF LABOUR PARTY MANIFESTOS, http://www.politicsresources.net/area 
/uk/man/lab97.htm (last visited June 19, 2012). 
 32. Dominic McGoldrick, The United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act 1998 in Theory 
and Practice, 50 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 901, 901-02, 905 (2001).  
 33. LEYLAND, supra note 8, at 170.  
 34. FRANCESCA KLUG, The United Kingdom Experience, in COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES ON BILLS OF RIGHTS 1 (Christine Debono & Tania Colwell eds., 2004). Some 
of the rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights are the freedom to be 
free from torture, the right to a fair trial, and freedom of religion. Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 3, 6, 9, Sept. 21, 1970, 213 
U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).  
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seen “as being ‘European’ and not connected to the UK.”35 Suspicion of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act has 
remained since its enactment over ten years ago.36 The Human Rights Act is 
also controversial because it upsets existing norms of judicial deference to 
parliament.37 
Perhaps the Human Rights Act’s most powerful component is its 
requirement that the three branches of government interact to ensure that 
British legislation adequately protects human rights.38 Each branch of the 
government plays a role in creating law under the Human Rights Act and, 
consequently, political (if not actual) power must be shared by all three 
government branches.39 Parliament gained a powerful new committee to 
oversee the human rights implications of new and existing laws: the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights.40 The judiciary gained two new powers: the 
  
 35. JoAnne Sweeny, The United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act: Using Its Past to 
Predict Its Future, 12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 39, 41 (2010).  
 36. Both the press, particularly the tabloids, and leaders in the Conservative Party 
have attacked the Human Rights Act. See, e.g., Macer Hall, Human Rights Act? Scrap it; 
Cameron’s Call to Ditch ‘Villains’ Charter’, THE EXPRESS, Dec. 9, 2008; Steve Doughty, 
Has this Judge Become a Law Unto Himself?, DAILY MAIL, Feb. 20, 2003, at 5. Even the 
Commission set to provide proposals for a British Bill of Rights has reached an impasse. 
Christopher Hope, Leaked Emails Point to “Fatal Divide” in Panel Drawing up Plans for 
Promised Bill of Rights; Leaks Reveal “Fatal Flaws” of Rights Panel, DAILY TEL., Mar. 13, 
2012, at 1. 
 37. Fears of judicial activism dominated the parliamentary debates surrounding the 
Human Rights Act’s passage into law. See Sweeny, supra note 35, at 63 (citing 582 PARL. 
DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1997) 1254 (Lord Waddington), 1238 (Lord Kingsland), 1266-68 
(Lord McClusky), 1267 (Lord McClusky), 1275 (Lord Borrie), 1262-63 (Lord Mayhew), 
1281 (Lord Wilberforce), 66 (Lord Donaldson), 1306 (Lord Henley), 1254 (Lord 
Waddington)).  
 38. This branch interaction was stressed when the Human Rights Act was being 
debated in Parliament. See, e.g., 314 PARL. DEB., H.C., (6th ser.) (1998), 1141 (U.K.), 
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmhansrd/vo980624 
/debtext/80624-47.htm#80624-47_spnew3. However, some members of the senior judiciary 
notably stated that it was not their place to engage in this dialogue. See, e.g., JOINT 
COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HUMAN 
RIGHTS ACT 1998 BEFORE THE J. COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, MINUTES, H.L. 66-iii, H.C. 332-
iii (2001) (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200001/jtselect/ 
jtrights/jtrights.htm (evidence presented by Right Honourable Lord Woolf of Barnes, Right 
Honourable Lord Phillips of Worth Matrayers, and Right Honourable Lord Bingham of 
Cornhill).  
 39. K. D. Ewing, The Human Rights Act and Parliamentary Democracy, 62 MODERN 
L. REV. 79, 79 (1999); Francesca Klug, Judicial Deference under the Human Rights Act 
1998, 2 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 125, 132 (2003).  
 40. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 19 (Eng.), available at http://www.legislation. 
gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/data.pdf; 621 PARL. DEB., H.L. (6th ser.) (2003) 11 (U.K.), available 
at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200001/ldhansrd/vo010122/text/10122-03. 
htm#column_11; During the debate in the Commons on the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights’ terms of reference, the then Deputy Leader of the House, Paddy Tipping MP, 
remarked that they were wide enough to allow the Committee to do “virtually what it wants.” 
361 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2001) 150 (U.K.), available at hansard.millbanksystems. 
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power to creatively interpret legislation to conform to the Human Rights 
Act and the power to declare legislation incompatible with European 
Convention on Human Rights.41 
Although scholars have lavished attention on the human rights impact 
the Human Rights Act has had in the United Kingdom,42 there has been very 
little scholarship devoted to the vast constitutional changes the Human 
Rights Act has wrought. For example, the British government structure now 
more closely resembles the government of the United States, with increased 
judicial independence and more evenly distributed power among the three 
branches of government.43 When the Human Rights Act shifted power away 
from the dominant executive to the legislature and the judiciary, it also 
created something of an American style of government with checks and 
balances between three (more) co-equal government branches. Each of 
these branches—executive, legislative and judicial—now has new strategies 
available to them when creating law.  
B. British Government Branch Strategies 
1. Executive 
Strategic action for the executive branch entails obtaining political office 
and exerting influence so that the executive’s preferences are taken into 
  
com/commons/2001/jan/15/human-rights-joint-committee.  
 41. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, §§ 3, 4 (Eng.). The European Convention on 
Human Rights is an international treaty that protects human rights in its European member 
states. The European Convention on Human Rights “sets forth a number of fundamental 
rights and freedoms,” such as “the right to life” and prohibition of torture. The European 
countries that have signed the European Convention on Human Rights must secure these 
rights and freedoms to everyone within their jurisdiction. In order to ensure that they do, the 
European Convention on Human Rights also established the European Court of Human 
Rights, which can hear “individual and inter-State petitions.” Summary of the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom, COUNSEL OF EUROPE, 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Summaries/Html/005.htm (last visited Oct., 2012). 
 42. See, e.g., Eric Barendt, Freedom of Expression in the United Kingdom Under the 
Human Rights Act 1998, 84 IND. L.J. 851 (2009); see also IAN LEIGH & ROGER MASTERMAN, 
MAKING RIGHTS REAL: THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT IN ITS FIRST DECADE (2008); see also 
Christine Sypnowich, Taking Britain’s Human Rights Act Seriously, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 105 
(2008). 
 43. The Constitutional Reform Act 2005, which separated the judiciary from the 
legislature and abolished the position of Lord Chancellor, also helped in creating a more 
American-style government. See Judith L. Maute, English Reforms to Judicial Selection: 
Comparative Lessons for American States? 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 387, 387-88 (2007); Peter 
L. Fitzgerald, Constitutional Crisis over the Proposed Supreme Court for the United 
Kingdom, 18 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 233, 257-58 (2004). Both the Constitutional Reform 
Act and the Human Rights Act were part of the Labour Party’s promise for “radical 
constitutional reform” in the 1997 general election. Sweeny, supra note 35, at 65-66. 
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account when laws are created.44 The executive branch must therefore 
strategize with the other two branches in order to ensure that legislation is 
passed and interpreted with the executive’s preferences in mind.45 Executive 
actions are also subject to legislative override or judicial review, which may 
cause the executive to take those branches’ preferences into account when 
enacting executive actions.46 However, in the United States, the President 
does have a unique and powerful weapon at his disposal: the power to veto 
legislation, which requires that Congress muster a two-thirds majority 
before that bill can become a law.47  
As noted above, a major difference between the British and American 
government systems is the American government’s separation of powers 
versus the United Kingdom’s integration of powers. The British legislature 
and the executive are “inextricably intertwined and interdependent” because 
every member of the executive is also a member of the legislature.48 The 
leader of the political party that has the majority of seats in the House of 
Commons, automatically becomes the Prime Minister.49 That person is also 
required to be a member of Parliament—either in the House of Commons or 
the House of Lords.50 The power of the executive over the legislature is also 
much stronger in the United Kingdom’s parliamentary system.51 The Prime 
Minister lacks a veto power,52 which means that Parliament does not need to 
take the executive’s views into account when drafting legislation. However, 
because the executive proposes almost all legislation considered by 
Parliament in the first place,53 the executive’s influence is very strong and, 
arguably, stronger than the President’s veto power.54  
  
 44. See generally Peter Ordeshook, The Emerging Discipline of Political Economy, 
in PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 
1990); see also McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in 
Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 9 (1994). 
 45. Jorgen Rasmussen, Executive and Legislative Roles, in POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND 
THE UNITED STATES 1, 19 (Richard Hodder-Williams & James Ceasar eds., 1986); 
McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory 
Interpretation, supra note 44, at 21.  
 46. Id.; Ernest A. Young, Taming the Most Dangerous Branch: The Scope and 
Accountability of Executive Power in the United States, in THE EXECUTIVE AND PUBLIC LAW 
174 (Paul Craig & Adam Tomkins eds., 2006).  
 47. Ingberman & Yao, supra note 1, at 357. 
 48. WALLES, supra note 12, at 78. 
 49. LEYLAND, supra note 8, at 86. If no political party has a majority in the House of 
Commons, a coalition can be created. JOHN OAKLAND, BRITISH CIVILIZATION: AN 
INTRODUCTION 109 (7th ed. 2011).  
 50. WALLES, supra note 12, at 77. 
 51. Rasmussen, supra note 45, at 2.  
 52. PUNNETT, supra note 7, at 246-47. 
 53. A. W. BRADLEY & K. D. EWING, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 185 
(13th ed. 2003). 
 54. OAKLAND, supra note 49, at 109. 
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The executives’ difference in power extends to their dealings with the 
judiciary. Although the President appoints federal judges and, in that 
respect, has power over the judiciary, the judiciary also has power over the 
President because it may strike down any executive action or executive-
proposed statute that it considers unconstitutional.55 Accordingly, the 
President’s ability to make law is limited both before and after the fact. In 
the United Kingdom, the judiciary has less power over the executive. The 
British judiciary has a severely limited ability to invalidate executive action 
or strike or otherwise affect primary legislation.56 The British executive 
branch, therefore, has a very small incentive to make sure that the judiciary 
will approve of its legislation.  
Because the British executive is also dominant over parliament, which 
dominates the judiciary, the British executive is typically thought of as the 
most powerful branch.57 The British executive branch’s historic power 
monopoly meant that it did not have to consider the preferences of the other 
government branches. However, as shown below, this power imbalance has 
been partially redressed with the Human Rights Act, which the legislature 
and judiciary to influence the executive in the creation of law. The 
legislature’s influence in the area of human rights has increased with the 
creation of the Joint Committee of Human Rights and the executive’s duty 
to report on the human rights implications of all bills presented to 
Parliament.58 The judiciary has gained the ability to interpret statutes more 
creatively and can now issue Declarations of Incompatibility against 
legislation that does not conform to the European Convention on Human 
Rights.59 
2. Legislature 
Like the executive, the legislative branch acts strategically so that its 
policy preferences will be reflected in the law. Legislators will create and 
enact laws to appease their constituents after conducting cost-benefit 
  
 55. See M. J. C. VILE, POLITICS IN THE USA 133 (5th ed., 1999); see also Young, 
Taming the Most Dangerous Branch: The Scope and Accountability of Executive Power in 
the United States, supra note 46, at 161, 174. However, the judiciary has generally looked 
with “tolerant eyes” upon the expansion of the President’s powers and duties. See ERNEST S. 
GRIFFITH, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 66 (6th ed., 1983).  
 56. LEYLAND, supra note 8, at 147; Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth 
Model of Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 707, 712-13 (2001); WATTS, supra note 23, 
at 141. Some have argued that the British judiciary has traditionally been disinterested in 
having the ability to overrule or strike down legislation, even legislation that contravenes 
fundamental principles of a democracy. See WATTS, supra note 23, at 142.  
 57. Rasmussen, supra note 45, at 2; WATTS, supra note 23, at 40, 120. 
 58. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 19 (Eng.).  
 59. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, §§ 3, 4 (Eng.).  
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analyses.60 Due to the time and energy legislators expend when creating 
statutes and the long-range and long-term effects these statutes can and 
should have, legislators strategize with the other government branches when 
drafting legislation.61  
In the United States, Congress proposes legislation so it makes the initial 
calculation as to how to word a piece of legislation so that it will not be 
blocked by the executive (via a veto) or the judiciary (via an unwanted 
interpretation or a ruling that the statute is unconstitutional).62 In such a 
scenario, Congress must predict how each branch would prefer the 
legislation to look as well as the strength of those preferences.63 Assuming 
that Congress is not confident that it can muster a two-thirds majority to 
override a veto, it will compromise with the President so that the President 
will not veto the statute.64 It will also compromise so that the judiciary will 
not overrule the statute.65  
In the United Kingdom, the executive proposes the majority of 
legislation and is also the chief proponent of most successful legislative 
amendments.66 Parliament then scrutinizes and tries to improve the 
proposed legislation.67 Although Parliament’s ability to draft legislation is 
severely limited, it can “legislatively veto” the executive’s proposed 
legislation by refusing to pass it as written.68 
However, legislative veto is unlikely because the executive’s party 
controls the House of Commons. Although both countries’ legislatures are 
organized along party lines with prominent positions going to majority party 
leaders, party affiliation in the United Kingdom determines almost 
invariably how a member of the Commons will vote.69 The strong party 
  
 60. J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS 20-21 
(2004); McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory 
Interpretation, supra note 44, at 11, 26. 
 61. See McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in 
Statutory Interpretation, supra note 44, at 16. 
 62. See id.; Milligan, Congressional End-Run: The Ignored Constraint on Judicial 
Review, supra note 6, at 265; James Meernik & Joseph Ignagni, Judicial Review and 
Coordinate Construction of the Constitution, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 447, 451 (1997). 
 63. For example, the House Judiciary Committee produces reports called Court 
Proceedings and Actions of Vital Interest to the Congress, which keeps Congress apprised of 
litigation involving constitutional issues such as the speech or debate clause. Louis Fisher, 
Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV. 707, 728 (1985). 
 64. See Martin, supra note 5, at 376. Even a president’s announcement that he will 
veto a certain piece of legislation can lead Congress to changing that legislation. See 
Ingberman & Yao, supra note 1, at 378. 
 65. PICKERILL, supra note 60, at 23. However, there is evidence that, without 
presidential support, Congress will be unable to override a judicial decision. Meernik & 
Ignagni, supra note 62, at 453. 
 66. See WALLES, supra note 12, at 78. 
 67. See id.; see also PUNNETT, supra note 7, at 249. 
 68. See Rasmussen, supra note 45, at 2; see also WALLES, supra note 12, at 77. 
 69. WALLES, supra note 12, at 78. Without party support, a Member of Parliament is 
unlikely to be re-elected. See PUNNETT, supra note 7, at 189; RODNEY BRAZIER, 
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system in the United Kingdom usually limits the House of Commons to the 
discussion or amendment, and then the final approval of Bills that are 
introduced by the executive.70 The House of Lords does not have strong 
party affiliations but it has the power only to delay legislation.71  
The Prime Minister therefore has an incentive to propose new legislation 
without much fear of a legislative override.72 Although Parliament can 
threaten the executive with refusal to pass the executive’s bill, the strong 
party system within the Commons makes that threat less credible than the 
President’s veto threat, particularly for a newly elected or popular Prime 
Minister or for a popular policy.73 However, in the human rights realm, the 
executive is more likely to compromise with Parliament because of the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights’ ability to scrutinize and seek evidence about 
any proposed legislation that impacts human rights.  
a.  The Joint Committee on Human Rights 
In the area of human rights law, the Joint Committee on Human Rights is 
a powerful force for the legislature. The Joint Committee on Human Rights 
is a bipartisan committee whose primary purpose is to evaluate bills with 
human rights implications.74 The Joint Committee on Human Rights writes 
  
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE: THE FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH GOVERNMENT 215 (3d ed., 1999); 
Diermeier & Feddersen, supra note 18, at 612. 
 70. See PUNNETT, supra note 7, at 249. 
 71. See Jackie Ashley, Lords Face Full Election under Brown Plans, GUARDIAN 
(May 21, 2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/may/21/politics.lords. Despite these 
limitations, the House of Lords’ ability to delay can be and has been deadly to bills and may 
constitute a useful check against an executive that operates with a clear majority in the 
Commons. See BRAZIER, supra note 69, at 258-60; PUNNETT, supra note 7, at 304. Because 
all bills are sessional, a one-year delay may be sufficient to kill a bill. For this reason, the 
executive must be especially wary of a House of Lords’ “veto” when drafting legislation. See 
BRAZIER, supra note 69, at 218-20. 
 72. This effect has declined recently and backbenchers are now more likely to not 
support policies of which they do approve, which can be embarrassing for the executive. Id. 
at 190-91; Politics, Gordon Brown Facing Biggest Ever Backbench Revolt Over Royal Mail 
Sell-Off, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 14, 2009, 8:26 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ 
4237403/Gordon-Brown-facing-biggest-ever-backbench-revolt-over-Royal-Mail-sell-off.html. 
This effect is particularly pronounced when the Prime Minister is considered to be weak or 
unpopular. Id.  
 73. See generally WEINGAST, supra note 16, at 664 (for a discussion on “credibility” 
of threats). There is evidence that a popular President is also more likely to veto legislation. 
See John T. Woolley, Institutions, the Election Cycle, and the Presidential Veto, 35 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 279, 299 (1991). 
 74. See generally Joint Select Committee, PARLIAMENT.UK, 
http://www.parliament.uk/jchr (last visited June 20, 2012); Anthony Lester, Parliamentary 
Scrutiny of Legislation Under the Human Rights Act 1998, 33 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. 
REV. 1, 2 (2002); Janet L. Hiebert, Parliament and the Human Rights Act: Can the JCHR 
Help Facilitate a Culture of Rights?, 4 INT’L J. CONST. LAW 1, 18 (2006); Janet L. Hiebert, 
New Constitutional Ideas: Can New Parliamentary Models Resist Judicial Dominance When 
Interpreting Rights?, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1963, 1978 (2003-2004); K. D. Ewing, The Human 
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several reports each year that scrutinize legislation for potential conflicts 
with the European Convention on Human Rights.75 To write these reports, 
the Joint Committee on Human Rights may demand more information from 
the executive branch or send specific questions for the executive branch to 
answer.76 The Joint Committee on Human Rights also becomes involved if 
the judiciary issues a Declaration of Incompatibility or orders other 
remedial measures under the Human Rights Act.77 
The Joint Committee on Human Rights’ most important task is the 
dialogue it creates between the executive and the legislature. After the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights obtains information from public interest 
groups and the executive branch, it passes on to Parliament, which uses the 
information to guide its debates.78 Although the executive can essentially 
ignore the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ questions or demands for 
information (and has in the past),79 by doing so, it risks the displeasure of 
Parliament. Parliament’s disapproval is likely to occur because both houses 
  
Rights Act and Parliamentary Democracy, 62 MODERN L. REV. 79, 97-98 (1999). The Joint 
Committee on Human Rights is also responsible for investigating potential human rights 
abuses by executive departments and making sure that the UK complies with its European 
Convention on Human Rights and other international rights obligations. See Ewing, supra, at 
97-98; Hiebert, Parliament and the Human Rights Act: Can the JCHR Help Facilitate a 
Culture of Rights?, supra note 74, at 18. 
 75. See Joint Committee on Human Rights: publications Session 2010-12, 
PARLIAMENT.UK, http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/ 
human-rights-committee/publications/previous-sessions/Session-2010-12/ (last visited June 
20, 2012). 
 76. See generally Hiebert, Parliament and the Human Rights Act: Can the JCHR 
Help Facilitate a Culture of Rights?, supra note 74, at 18-19 (for an in-depth discussion 
regarding how the Joint Committee interacts with the executive and Parliament).  
 77. Id. at 21-22. By its own account, the Joint Committee on Human Rights takes its 
role very seriously and considers as part of its responsibilities to “scrutin[ize] the adequacy 
of the [executive]’s response to such judgments and, in some cases, decide[e] for itself 
whether a change in the law is necessary to protect human rights and, if so, what that change 
should be.” JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, MONITORING THE GOVERNMENT’S 
RESPONSE TO COURT JUDGMENTS FINDING BREACHES OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SIXTEENTH REPORT, 
H.L. 128, H.C. 728, at 9 (2007) (U.K.) (hereinafter JOINT COMM. ON HUM. RTS., SIXTEENTH 
REPORT).  
 78. Janet L. Hiebert, Interpreting a Bill of Rights: The Importance of Legislative 
Rights Review, 35 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 235, 251 (2005); See, e.g., JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ADULTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES, PRESS NOTICE (2007) 
(U.K.), available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/pn-28-cfe-adults-with-
learning-disabilities-290307.pdf; JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
OF OLDER PERSONS IN HEALTHCARE, PRESS NOTICE (2007) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-archive/joint-committee-on-
human-rights/jchr201206pn05/. 
 79. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY: WELFARE 
REFORM BILL, TWENTY-FIRST REPORT, 2010-12, H.L. 233, H.C. 1704, ¶ 1.10 (U.K.) “The 
Department of Work and Pensions did not provide us with such a human rights memorandum 
in relation to this Bill. It was encouraged to do so, but declined.” Id. 
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rely upon the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ reports used in their 
deliberations.80   
The Joint Committee on Human Rights can also use parliamentary 
debates to delay the passage of bills, especially in the House of Lords, 
where party affiliation is weaker.81 Even in the Commons, the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights can give the Opposition something to focus on 
to rally resistance to proposed legislation.82 In such a situation, the 
executive branch may prefer to change the bill instead of attempting to force 
it through Parliament.  
Although the executive has explicitly stated that it will not follow the 
Joint Committee on Human Rights’ advice,83 the executive has, on more 
than one occasion, amended its proposed legislation in response to the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights’ statement that a bill was incompatible with 
the Human Rights Act.84 For example, due to concerns raised by the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights regarding potential human rights violations in 
the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Bill, several changes were made in 
the Commons, such as increased safeguards for certifying a person as a 
“terrorist.”85 On the other hand, there are still instances of executive delays 
  
 80. Dawn Oliver, Constitutional Scrutiny of Executive Bills, 4 MACQUARIE L. J. 33, 
49 (2004); Indeed, the House of Lords has even delayed its debates in order to allow the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights to review a proposed bill. Hiebert, Parliament and the Human 
Rights Act: Can the JCHR Help Facilitate a Culture of Rights?, supra note 74, at 32; KLUG, 
The United Kingdom Experience, supra note 32, at 7. 
 81. PUNNETT, supra note 7, at 304. 
 82. See 457 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 1322 (2007) (U.K.) (criticizing the Tribunals, 
Courts and Enforcement Bill 2007); The Joint Committee on Human Rights may also have a 
(smaller) effect on the judiciary. Courts have shown themselves increasingly willing to use 
the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ reports as either persuasive authorities or to inform 
their judgments because often the same compatibility issue will have already presented itself 
before the Joint Committee on Human Rights. See, e.g., R. (Animal Defenders International) 
v. Sec’y of State for Culture, Media and Sport, [2008] UKHL 15 [14-21] (agreeing with the 
Joint Committee on Human Rights that the Communications Act 2003’s ban on all political 
advertising was incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights); In these 
situations, courts can use the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ report to access the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights’ opinions on compatibility, the executive’s responses to their 
questions and the extensive parliamentary debates the report inspired. Interview with Murray 
Hunt, Joint Committee on Human Rights Legal Advisor, (May 19, 2008); see also Hiebert, 
Parliament and the Human Rights Act: Can the JCHR Help Facilitate a Culture of Rights?, 
supra note 74, at 21. 
 83. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ORAL AND WRITTEN EVIDENCE: HUMAN 
RIGHTS POLICY, 2006, H.L. 143, H.C. 830-i, ¶ 40, 47 (U.K.). 
 84. Hiebert, Parliament and the Human Rights Act: Can the JCHR Help Facilitate a 
Culture of Rights?, supra note 74, at 28. 
 85. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY 
BILL, FIFTH REPORT, 2001, H.L. 51, H.C. 420, ¶¶ 8, 19 (U.K.). 
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and resistance to measures suggested by the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights.86  
All in all, the executive branch is likely to anticipate questions from the 
Joint Committee on Human Rights and may even alter its legislative 
proposals to avoid any fallout that the Joint Committee on Human Right’s 
questioning or negative conclusions may have on Parliamentary debates.87 
There is also evidence that the executive branch is becoming more 
amenable to working with the Joint Committee on Human Rights as it drafts 
legislation, and communication between the two groups has improved over 
time.88 For that reason, the Joint Committee on Human Rights is a powerful 
political player for Parliament. 
b.  Human Rights Act Section 19 Statement of 
Compatibility 
Section 19 of the Human Rights Act has also had a positive impact on 
the interactions between the British legislature and executive. Under Section 
19, when a Minister introduces any bill into Parliament, he or she must state 
either that the bill is compatible with the European Convention on Human 
Rights or that he or she wishes Parliament to proceed with it anyway.89 
These statements of compatibility create “serious pre-legislative scrutiny of 
all new legislation for conformity with the [European Convention on 
Human Rights].”90 The statement of compatibility does not explicitly 
prohibit the executive from proposing legislation that is incompatible with 
the European Convention on Human Rights, but it does present significant 
political obstacles, such as increased Parliamentary scrutiny (especially 
from the Joint Committee on Human Rights) and public disapproval, for 
doing so.91 For example, the Joint Committee on Human Rights has 
effectively used statements of compatibility to question the executive and 
guide debates.92  
  
 86. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, MONITORING THE GOVERNMENT’S 
RESPONSE TO COURT JUDGMENTS FINDING BREACHES OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SIXTEENTH REPORT, 
H.L. 128, H.C. 728, at 25-26 (2007) (U.K.).  
 87. Hiebert, Parliament and the Human Rights Act: Can the JCHR Help Facilitate a 
Culture of Rights?, supra note 74, at 21.  
 88. Oliver, Constitutional Scrutiny of Executive Bills, supra note 80, at 43; David 
Feldman, Injecting Law into Politics and Politics into Law: Legislative and Judicial 
Perspectives on Constitutional Human Rights, 34 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 104, 117 (2005); 
David Feldman, The Impact of Human Rights on the UK Legislative Process, 25 STATUTE L. 
REV. 91 (2004); Hiebert, Parliament and the Human Rights Act: Can the JCHR Help 
Facilitate a Culture of Rights?, supra note 74, at 24. 
 89. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 19 (Eng.); BRAZIER, supra note 69, at 10.  
 90. Murray Hunt, The Human Rights Act and Legal Culture: The Judiciary and the 
Legal Profession, 26 J.L.S. 86, 89-90 (1999). 
 91. Ewing, supra note 74, at 96-97. 
 92. See, JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SCRUTINY OF BILLS: FINAL PROGRESS 
REPORT, SEVENTEENTH REPORT, 2002-3 H.L. 186, H.C. 1278, at Appendix 1 (U.K.); The 
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Statements of compatibility ensure that the executive branch begins to 
strategize before it presents any bills to Parliament because the statement of 
compatibility must be made before a bill’s second reading.93 The 
executive’s strategy must also take into account possible questioning by the 
Joint Committee on Human Rights and any debates that this questioning 
may prompt. Making a plausible statement of compatibility therefore 
requires some investigation or thought to the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights’ preference for the law.94 The executive must ensure that its 
statements of compatibility have sound backing that can withstand any 
questions the Joint Committee on Human Rights may have.95 Accordingly, 
the executive is more likely to compromise even before a bill reaches 
Parliament when the Human Rights Act’s Section 19 is implicated.  
The power of Section 19 is evident in the fact that the executive is 
reluctant to present bills that cannot be supported by a credible statement of 
compatibility.96 The executive has failed to make a statement of 
compatibility only twice. In one instance, when a Minister proposed 
  
executive’s statement of compatibility (or lack thereof) is also likely to have substantial 
impact on the judiciary’s interpretation of the legislation if it is ever challenged in court. 
Although not controlling, a statement of compatibility can give guidance to the court how to 
interpret the legislation under Section 3 or, at the very least, indicate to the judiciary that it 
should engage in Section 3 interpretation because the executive intended the legislation to be 
compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. Aileen Kavanagh, Pepper v 
Hart and Matters of Constitutional Principle, 121 L. Q. REV. 98, 119-20 (2005); R (on the 
application of Q and others) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2003] 2 EWCA (Civ) 
905; On the other hand, a statement that the executive cannot affirmatively aver that the 
proposed legislation is compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights indicates 
to the judiciary that the executive was not concerned with making the legislation compatible 
and will make it more likely that the judiciary will opt to issue a DOI. McGoldrick, supra 
note 32, at 924. 
 93. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 19(1) (Eng.) (a “second reading” is a debate on 
the bill held before the general body of a legislature (such as the House of Commons or the 
House of Lords), as opposed to before a committee or other group).  
 94. One commentator has asserted that the statement of compatibility “should ensure 
that Ministers will scrupulously avoid introducing legislation that would deny citizens their 
Convention rights.” BRAZIER, supra note 69, at 10. Another has stated that, in practice, 
Section 19 statements, as they are currently used “are virtually meaningless and say little 
more than that the [executive] expects those that implement the measures to obey the law.” 
John Wadham, The Human Rights Act: One Year On, EUR. H.R. L. REV. 620, 624 (2001).  
 95. The Joint Committee on Human Rights has been particularly effective in 
convincing the executive to provide more explanation for its Section 19 Statements of 
Compatibility on the face of its bills, which has enhanced parliamentary debate. David 
Feldman, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation and Human Rights, PUB. L. 323, 338 (2002). 
 96. This is not to say that the executive branch does not engage in deception or 
subterfuge when making these statements to downplay any negative human rights effects that 
a bill may have. Hiebert, Parliament and the Human Rights Act: Can the JCHR Help 
Facilitate a Culture of Rights?, supra note 74, at 12. In such situations, it is up to the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights and Parliament (the Opposition, most likely) to bring all 
elements of the Bill to light so that the full implications of the Bill may be discussed and 
weighed. Id. 
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legislation (the Communications Bill) with a statement that it was not 
compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, she received 
substantial criticism from within Parliament and from political 
commentators.97 As a result, the executive assured Parliament that, should 
the Communications Bill be declared incompatible by the judiciary, the 
executive would “reconsider” its position and introduce remedial 
legislation.98 Moreover, due to pressure from the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, the executive now gives more thorough statements of 
compatibility under Section 19 that include the executive’s reasoning and 
not just a bald statement of compatibility.99 
In sum, despite some executive resistance, the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights has done much to increase its own influence and power so 
that it can force the executive to change proposed legislation. The Joint 
Committee on Human Rights’ desire to increase its power is easily 
explained strategically: the Joint Committee on Human Rights is attempting 
to ensure that British laws conform to its preferences as much as possible. 
The Joint Committee on Human Rights ensures that Parliament has an 
active role in the creation and amendment of laws that affect human 
rights.100 To accomplish that goal, the Joint Committee on Human Rights 
uses Section 19 of the Human Rights Act, which was made more powerful 
by the Joint Committee on Human Rights itself.101  
  
 97. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SCRUTINY OF BILLS: PROGRESS REPORT, 
FIRST REPORT, 2002, H.L. 24, H.C. 191, ¶ 11 (U.K.); Aileen Kavanagh, The Role of 
Parliamentary Intention in Adjudication Under the Human Rights Act 1998, 26 O.J.L.S 179, 
181 (2006); In the first instance of a failure to make a statement of compatibility, the House 
of Lords blocked the Commons’ attempt to amend Section 28 of the Local Government Act 
2003, which had forbidden the promotion of homosexuality. The executive warned that this 
amendment could be incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights and 
presented a statement to that effect. Section 28 was later removed from the Local 
Government Act 2003. 395 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2002) 789 (U.K.). 
 98. 395 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2002) 789 (U.K.) (suggesting that if the Bill 
were to be declared incompatible by the European Court of Human Rights, the executive 
pledged to amend the legislation in accordance with that judgment); 
JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SCRUTINY OF BILLS: FURTHER PROGRESS REPORT, 
REPORT, 2002-3, H.L. 50, ¶40 (U.K.); Tom Lewis, Political Advertising and the 
Communications Act 2003: Tailored Suit or old Blanket?, 3 EUR. H.R. L. REV. 290, 293 
(2005).  
 99. 629 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2001) 116WA(U.K.); 643 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th 
ser.) (2003) 154WA (U.K.); Feldman, supra note 95, at 339. 
 100. Hiebert, supra note 78, at 251.  
 101. 629 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2001) 116WA(U.K.); 643 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th 
ser.) (2003) 154WA (U.K.); Feldman, supra note 95, at 339. 
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3. The Judiciary 
Like the executive and legislature, the judiciary has policy preferences it 
wishes to advance with its decisions.102 In order to ensure that those 
branches do not legislate over its decisions even if they disagree with it, the 
judiciary takes into account the preferences of both the executive and the 
legislature when making its decisions.103 The fear of overturned decisions is 
often enough for the judiciary to alter its decisions to avoid harming the 
judiciary’s reputation, credibility, and legitimacy.104 If courts take it upon 
themselves to alter their holdings, they can probably do so in a less extreme 
manner than the elected branches had contemplated and the elected 
branches will not bother to spend the time and energy necessary to overturn 
the judiciary’s compromise decision.105  
In addition to compromising, the judiciary has other strategic tools it can 
use. When there is tension between the elected branches, the judiciary can 
team up with one elected branch to overpower the other. For example, the 
Supreme Court and the President can work together to achieve political 
objectives and overcome “political barriers that hamper the realization of a 
governing coalition’s agenda.”106 These obstacles include: recalcitrant states 
who refuse to follow the national agenda, a fragmented government that is 
unable to change the status quo and overcome entrenched interests, 
compromises that had to be made to ensure that certain laws passed, and 
conflicting or hostile constituents.107 Similarly, a judiciary that faces an 
ideologically agreeable legislature has more freedom to reinterpret or, when 
constitutionally possible, strike statutes enacted by past legislatures. 
The judiciary can also oppose both the other branches of government if it 
has “accumulated stockpile of political capital with the general public” due 
  
 102. William N. Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation 
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 373 (1991). 
 103. Luke Milligan, Modeling the Congressional End-Run Constraint, 45 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 863, 870 (2011); Tony Caporale, A Positive Political Model of Supreme Court 
Economic Decisions, 68 S. ECON. J. 693, 695 (2002); Eskridge, supra note 102, at 390, 403; 
Meernik & Ignagni, supra note 62, at 458; but see Virginia A. Hettinger & Christopher Zorn, 
Explaining the Incidence and Timing of Congressional Responses to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
30 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5, 21 (2005). 
 104. See Lee Epstein, et al., The Supreme Court as a Strategic National Policymaker, 
50 EMORY L.J. 583, 599-600 (2001); but see Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games 
in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28, 42 (1997). 
 105. McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and 
the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1654 (1995). Judicial decisions about controversial 
issues are especially difficult for the executive and legislature to override because of 
conflicting interest groups and constituencies. Eskridge, supra note 102, at 377. 
 106. Keith E. Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for 
the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
583, 584 (2005). 
 107. Id. at 586-91. 
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to the institution’s history and prestige.108 In such a situation, the judiciary’s 
political capital may force elected officials to work within the court’s 
rules.109 The judiciary can also appeal to public sentiment by issuing 
decisions that follow existing and unpopular legislation with the hope of 
causing a backlash.110 However, for judicial activism to last, it must take 
place in a favorable political environment.111 If the judiciary opposes the 
elected branches that have popular support, it is unlikely to be successful 
and may become vulnerable to sanctions from the publicly-supported 
elected branches.112  
In contrast to the American judiciary, the British judiciary’s ability to 
oppose other branches of the government is limited in several ways. First, 
until recently, the judiciary itself was more integrated with the other 
branches of the government. As a participant in all three branches of the 
government, the Lord Chancellor was the epitome of integration of powers 
in the UK.113 The British Supreme Court was also part of both the 
legislature and judiciary.114 This commingling of the judiciary, legislature, 
and executive and the independence of the judiciary ended with the 
enactment of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005.115 Most notably, the 
Supreme Court Justices may no longer sit in Parliament; they are now 
  
 108. Whittington, supra note 106, at 583, 585;  
Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme 
Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 648 (1992).  
 109. Whittington, supra note 106, at 585; see also Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 104, 
at 640 (providing evidence that the government branches can be pitted against each other and 
support for one can outweigh support for the others). 
 110. McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and 
the Rule of Law, supra note 105, at 1655. 
 111. Whittington, supra note 106, at 583. 
 112. An example is the Supreme Court’s repeated striking of FDR’s popular New 
Deal legislation. See McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial 
Doctrine and the Rule of Law, supra note 105, at 1669-71.  
 113. Prior to the CRA, the Lord Chancellor was appointed by the Prime Minister to 
his executive position, was the Speaker the House of Lords, appointed Law Lords (after 
consultation with the Prime Minister), and was both the supreme judge of England and a Law 
Lord himself. ROBERT STEVENS, THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY 2 (1993); see also 
FRED L. MORRISON, COURTS AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN ENGLAND 200 (1973). After the 
CRA, he or she is still a member of the executive and has a smaller role with regard to 
judicial appointments.  
 114. BRAZIER, supra note 69, at 281. In fact, until 2009, they were called the House of 
Lords Appellate Division. Id.  
 115. Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, § 3 (U.K.); see also Lord Windlesham, 
The Constitutional Reform Act 2005: Ministers, Judges and Constitutional Change: Part 1, 
[2005] P.L. 806, 816; see also JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SCRUTINY OF BILLS: 
FINAL PROGRESS REPORT, TWENTY-THIRD REPORT, 2003-4, H.L. 210 (U.K.) (stating the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights’ analysis of the CRA).  
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judges only.116 Accordingly, the British judiciary now appears to be more 
closely structured to the American judiciary.117  
Second, the British judiciary is fundamentally different from its 
American counterpart because it is subordinate to Parliament. Unlike the 
American Supreme Court, the British Supreme Court cannot overrule an 
Act of Parliament on the grounds of constitutionality.118 However, this lack 
of power has not prevented judges from questioning the executive in their 
judicial opinions, which are highly publicized.119  Due to the executive’s 
strong party-control over Parliament, it is relatively easy for the executive to 
override judicial decisions.120 Due to this executive power, the judiciary will 
be less likely to risk making a decision that is not aligned with the executive 
or Parliament’s preferences. 
Of all of these restrictions on its power, the British judiciary’s reverence 
towards Parliament is the most limiting because it causes the judiciary to 
defer to parliament even when it arguably should not. The doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty, which is axiomatic in the British government, 
dictates that the judiciary must be subservient to Parliament.121 Historically, 
the British judiciary has consistently deferred to Parliament because of this 
doctrine.122 Even though the judiciary has become slightly more activist in 
recent years,123 the judiciary still views its role as giving effect to the will of 
Parliament. Because the judiciary also views itself as subordinate to 
Parliament, the judiciary commonly uses deferential language when 
  
 116. Mary L. Clark, Advice and Consent vs. Silence and Dissent? The Contrasting 
Roles of the Legislature in the U.S. and U.K. Judicial Appointments, 71 LA. L. REV. 451, 
477-78 (2011). 
 117. See Louis E. Wolcher, A Philosophical Investigation into Methods of 
Constitutional Interpretation in the United States and the United Kingdom, 13 VA. J. SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 239, 276-77 (2006). The intended effect of the statute was to make the UK’s 
judiciary conform to the prevailing notion in constitutional democracies that the judiciary 
should be appear to be independent from the other branches of government. See id. 
 118. BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 53, at 53. 
 119. See RICHARD HODDER-WILLIAMS, Courts of Last Resort, in POLITICS IN BRITAIN 
AND THE UNITED STATES 146, 150-51 (Richard Hodder-Williams & James Caesar eds., 
1986). For example, Laws, L.J., has warned the executive that its asylum country list system 
left “the United Kingdom’s compliance with [European Convention on Human Rights] 
Article 3 fragile.” Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. Javad Nasseri, [2008] 3 W.L.R. 
1386, [42] (Eng.). 
 120. See Cooter & Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 299. 
 121. As articulated by A.V. Dicey, Parliament in the UK is supreme and no other 
power can overrule it, including the judiciary. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF 
THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 38 (5th ed. 1897). 
 122. LEYLAND, supra note 8, at 147. In contrast, the United States Supreme Court sees 
itself as delivering the “final word” on the meaning of the Constitution, though it does defer 
to Congressional interpretations of the Constitution. Fisher, supra note 60, at 715 (quoting 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)); see also PICKERILL, supra note 60, at 14. 
 123. Wolcher, supra note 117, at 287. 
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interpreting statutes.124 The judiciary has a limited ability to affect the 
actions of Parliament and the executive because it traditionally defers to 
Parliament and is unable to strike down unconstitutional statutes.125  
When laws impact human rights, however, the picture changes. The 
executive can still take some comfort in the British judiciary’s deference to 
Parliament and in the judiciary’s inability to decide on the constitutionality 
of human rights statutes, both of which make the judiciary less able to 
thwart the executive’s intentions. However, when proposing new laws, the 
British executive must still take into consideration the judiciary’s new 
powers to creatively interpret a statute or declare it incompatible with the 
European Convention on Human Rights.126  
a.  Power to Interpret 
Section 3 of the Human Rights Act empowers British courts to interpret 
all legislation to be compatible with the European Convention on Human 
Rights insofar as it is “possible” to do so.127 Interpretative techniques such 
as narrowing the applicability or reading terms into a statute are now 
available to the judiciary, even when the statute being interpreted is not 
ambiguous.128 Commentators,129 executive representatives,130 and judges131 
disagree among themselves as to how far the judiciary can strain an 
unambiguous statute in order to make it compatible with the European 
  
 124. See R v. A, [2001] UKHL 25, [58], 1 A.C. 45 (H.L.) (Lord Hope of Craighead) 
(appeal taken from Eng.) (“[I]t is appropriate in some circumstances for the judiciary to 
defer, on democratic grounds, to the considered opinion of the elected body as to where the 
balance is to be struck between the rights of the individual and the needs of society.”). 
 125. See WATTS, supra note 23, at 141. 
 126. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, §§ 3-4 (Eng.). 
 127. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 3 (Eng.); see also Sheldrake v. DPP, [2004] 
UKHL 43, [29], [2005] 1 A.C. 264 (H.L,) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 128. Alison L. Young, Judicial Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act 1998, 61 
CAMBRIDGE L. J. 53, 62 (2002). 
 129. Id.; Aileen Kavanagh, The Role of Parliamentary Intention in Adjudication 
Under the Human Rights Act 1998, supra note 97, at 190; Gavin Phillipson, (Mis)-Reading 
Section 3 of the Human Rights Act, 119 L.Q.R. 183, 187 (2003); Conor A. Gearty, 
Reconciling Parliamentary Democracy and Human Rights, L.Q.R. 248, 254 (2002); Lord 
Lester, Developing Constitutional Principles of Public Law, PUB. L., WIN 684, 691 (2001); 
Clive Walker & Russell L. Weaver, The United Kingdom Bill of Rights 1998: The 
Modernisation of Rights in the Old World, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 497, 545 (2000); 
Richard Clayton, The Limits of What’s “Possible”: Statutory Construction Under the Human 
Rights Act, EUR. H.R. L. REV. 559 (2002). 
 130. Young, Judicial Sovereignty and the Human Rights Act 1998, supra note 128, at 
55 (comparing Jack Straw’s statements to those in the executive’s White Paper “Rights 
Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill.”). 
 131. See Lord Irvine, Activism and Restraint: Human Rights and the Interpretative 
Process, EUR. H.R. L. REV. 350 (1999); Lord Steyn, The New Legal Landscape, EUR. H.R. L. 
REV. 549 (2000). 
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Convention on Human Rights.132 All agree that Section 3 allows judges to 
be more creative when interpreting a statute and even alter the statute’s 
wording if doing so would make the statute compatible with the European 
Convention on Human Rights.133 This power to interpret creatively may 
also lead to interpretations that are not desired by the executive or 
Parliament.134 Courts may even become bolder and more willing to defy 
Parliament with a unique and unwanted interpretation of a statute.135 
When responding to judicial decisions regarding legislation that impacts 
human rights, the calculations of the British executive and legislature will 
be similar to those of their American counterparts. If the judiciary interprets 
a statute under Section 3 in a way that the executive does not like, the 
executive must decide how to draft new legislation, if it chooses to at all. 
But the British judiciary must also anticipate the reality that the executive, 
due to the executive’s party control over Parliament, will find re-legislating 
much easier than Congress would. Therefore, the British judiciary has 
reason to be conservative in its interpretations.  
  
 132. For examples of judges creatively interpreting statutes, see Ghaidan v. Mendoza, 
[2002] EWCA (Civ) 1533 (Eng.) (changing wording of Rent Act 1977 so that it applied to 
same-sex and unmarried couples as well as married heterosexual couples); R v. Sec’y of 
State for the Home Dep’t,[2002] EWCA (Civ) 273 (Eng.) (rewriting section 2 of the 1997 
Crime (Sentences) Act so that multiple offenders will not be sentenced to life imprisonment 
unless they constitute a significant risk to the public). For cases setting limits on Section 3, 
see Re S (Minors) (Care Order: Implementation of Care Plan), [2002] UKHL 10, [38], 2 
A.C. 291 (H.L.) (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead) (appeal taken from Eng.) (“[N]ot all 
provisions in primary legislation can be rendered Convention compliant by the application of 
section 3(1).”); Donoghue v. Poplar Hous. & Regeneration Cmty Ass’n, [2001] EWCA (Civ) 
595, [75], [2002] Q.B. 48 (Lord Woolf C.J.) (appeal taken from Eng.); R v. Lambert [2001] 
UKHL 37, [79]-[81], [2002] 2. A.C. 545 (H.L.) (Lord Hope of Craighead) (appeal taken 
from Eng.).  
 133. David Bonner, et al., Judicial Approaches to the Human Rights Act, 52 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 549, 556 (2003). It arguably even requires judges to do so. Lester, The Art of the 
Possible—Interpreting Statutes Under the Human Rights Act, supra note 31, 669 (1998).  
 134. However, this power is not unlimited. The judiciary cannot depart substantially 
from a “fundamental feature” of the statute or rewrite a whole statute or scheme because that 
is still Parliament’s responsibility. See generally Ghaidan v. Mendoza, [2004] UKHL 30, 
[2004] 2 A.C. 557 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.); In re S, [2002] UKHL 10, [40] (Lord 
Nicholls) (Eng.); R v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2002] UKHL 46, [59], [2003] 1 
A.C. 837 (H.L.) (Lord Steyn) (appeal taken from Eng.) (“Section 3(1) is not available where 
the suggested interpretation is contrary to express statutory words or is by implication 
necessarily contradicted by the statute.”); Bellinger v. Bellinger, [2003] UKHL 21, [2003] 4 
A.C. 467 (H.L.) (Lord Nicholls) (Eng.); R v. D.M., [2011] EWCA (Crim) 2752 [32] (Eng.) 
(Courts cannot use the Human Rights Act to “go against the grain of the legislation.”) (citing 
Ghaidan, [2004] 2 A.C. 557)). For a fuller discussion of these cases, see generally Conor 
Gearty, Revisiting Section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act, 119 L.Q.R. 551, 551-52 (2003). 
 135. On the other hand, this greater transparency of values may also make courts more 
open to public scrutiny and, therefore, more cautious not to appear to unjustly oppose 
Parliament, which, as an elected branch, arguably has more public support. 
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b.  Declaration of Incompatibility 
Under Section 4 of the Human Rights Act, if a senior court136 determines 
that a piece of primary legislation137 cannot be interpreted to be compatible 
with the Convention, it may issue a Declaration of Incompatibility.138 This 
declaration has no immediate effect, but does put political pressure on 
Parliament and the executive to bring the legislation into compliance with 
the Convention.139 The Declaration of Incompatibility even opens up a 
remedial “fast track” that the executive may use to quickly alter the 
incompatible legislation through regulations that do not go through the full 
debate process in Parliament.140 As with Section 3, commentators, judges, 
and government officials disagree regarding the actual power of a 
Declaration of Incompatibility. Some argue that the sovereignty of 
Parliament remains intact because Parliament can ignore Declarations of 
Incompatibility whenever it wishes.141 Others equate a Declaration of 
Incompatibility with the United States Supreme Court’s ability to void a 
statute because Parliament and the executive will “almost never” ignore a 
Declaration of Incompatibility.142   
  
 136. Under Human Rights Act Section 4(5), the only courts that can issue DOIs are 
the Supreme Court, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the Courts-Martial Appeal 
Court, the High Court of Justiciary sitting otherwise than as a trial court or the Court of 
Session (in Scotland), and the High Court or the Court of Appeal (in England and Wales or 
Northern Ireland). Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 4(5) (Eng.). 
 137. Secondary legislation (such as implementing regulations) and administrative acts 
may be declared void and unenforceable by the judiciary under the Human Rights Act unless 
their primary statutes are also incompatible. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 3 (Eng.); 
Vick, supra note 29, at 355-56. 
 138. Although this power is phrased as discretionary, if the court determines that it 
cannot interpret the offending legislation compatibly, its only remaining choices are to issue 
a statement of incompatibility or do nothing, which would make the court in violation of its 
own duties under Section 6 of the Human Rights Act.  
 139. Unfortunately, this does nothing to help the litigant, who is still bound by the 
incompatible statute. For this reason, two commentators have noted that it is actually better 
for the litigant if the court attempts to interpret the statute, which will have a positive effect 
on the litigant, than to issue a DOI. Ian Leigh & Laurence Lustgarten, Making Rights Real: 
The Courts, Remedies and the Human Rights Act, 58 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 509, 538  
(“Issuance of a [DOI] means that, in practical terms, the plaintiff has lost.”). 
 140. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 10 (Eng.). The executive has used this power 
in at least one instance to amend the Mental Health Act 1983. See R v. Mental Health 
Tribunal (N. & E. London Region), [2001] EWCA (Civ) 415, [2002] Q.B. 1 (appeal taken 
from Eng.); See The Mental Health Act, 1983, (Remedial) Order 2001.  
 141. See Vick, supra note 29, at 363; Bonner et al., supra note 133, at 562; Gearty, 
Reconciling Parliamentary Democracy and Human Rights, supra note 129, at 251; Ewing, 
supra note 39, at 99. 
 142. See 582 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1997) 1276 (U.K.); Lord Hoffman, Human 
Rights and the House of Lords, 62 MOD. L. REV. 159 (1999); Danny Nicol, Are Convention 
Rights a No-Go Zone for Parliament?, PUB. L. 438, 441-42 (2002) (quoting a speech made 
by Lord Steyn to the Mansfield Law Society on October 10, 2001); Lester, The Art of the 
Possible—Interpreting Statutes Under the Human Rights Act, supra note 31, at 671. 
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In practice, the judiciary often limited the effectiveness of the 
Declaration of Incompatibility.143 For example, courts have been deferential 
when deciding whether to issue a Declaration of Incompatibility at all.144 It 
is clear that Declarations of Incompatibility were intended to be used rarely, 
with interpretation the more common solution to an incompatibility 
problem.145 Judges have taken this to heart and seem reluctant to issue 
Declarations of Incompatibility. Instead, judges defer to Parliament, 
especially on issues that they consider traditionally within Parliament’s 
purview, such as social and economic policies.146 Courts are also more 
likely to find compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights 
by giving deference to well-articulated executive or Parliamentary 
decisions, especially when the decisions explicitly mention that the 
European Convention on Human Rights was considered.147  
On the other hand, although they are not explicitly required to do so, the 
executive and Parliament have responded to every Declaration of Incompat-
ibility issued.148 While some responses may have been long overdue or crit-
  
 143. For example, in McKerr, the Supreme Court held that DOIs are not retroactive. 
See In re McKerr, [2004] UKHL 12 (appeal taken from N. Ir.); JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS, ORAL AND WRITTEN EVIDENCE: HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, 2006, H.L. 143, H.C. 830-i, 
at 146 (U.K.). This means that any breaches that took place before 2000 essentially have no 
judicial remedy and may only be rectified by executive action, which is likely to be in 
response to a decision by the European Court of Human Rights. Although the executive has 
acknowledged to the Joint Committee on Human Rights that it has a responsibility to 
implement pre-2000 European Court of Human Rights decisions, there have been substantial 
delays in doing so. JOINT COMM. ON HUM. RTS., SIXTEENTH REPORT, supra note 77, at 150. In 
certain circumstances, such as substantive criminal law violations, there is no way under 
British law to overturn the improper conviction. Id. at 147.  
 144. Francesca Klug, Judicial Deference under the Human Rights Act 1998, supra 
note 39, at 132 (2003). 
 145. 582 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1997) 1231 (U.K.) (Lord Irvine of Lairg L.C.). 
 146. See Int’l Transp. Roth GmbH v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dept., [2002] 
EWCA (Civ) 158, [2003] Q.B. 728 (appeal taken from Eng.) (detailing the “spectrum” of 
deference); David Pannick, Principles of Interpretation of Convention Rights Under the 
Human Rights Act and the Discretionary Area of Judgment, PUB. L. 545, 549 (1998); Klug, 
Judicial Deference under the Human Rights Act 1998, supra note 39, at 129; Richard A. 
Edwards, Judicial Deference Under the Human Rights Act, 65 MOD. L. REV. 859, 860 (2002). 
 147. See Belfast City Council v. Miss Behavin’ Ltd, [2007] UKHL 19, [26] (Lord 
Rodger of Earlsferry) (appeal taken from N. Ir.); R v. Governors of Denbigh High Sch., 
[2006] UKHL 15, [2007] 1 A.C. 100 (H.L.) [31] (appeal taken from Eng.). In fact, the 
Supreme Court has noted that there may be some cases where they will uphold the 
executive’s discretion no matter what its decision as long as the executive has shown that it 
has considered the relevant human rights issues. Belfast City Council, [2007] UKHL 19, [44] 
(Lord Mance) (Eng.). 
 148. LORD CHANCELLOR & SECRETARY OF STATE FOR JUSTICE, RESPONDING TO HUMAN 
RIGHTS JUDGMENTS: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS’, 
THIRTY-FIRST REPORT, 2007-8, (U.K.), available at http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/cm75/7524/7524.pdf. 
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icized as insufficient,149 no Declaration of Incompatibility has gone unan-
swered. The executive has changed the laws in response to Declarations of 
Incompatibility, even in very controversial areas such as immigration and 
anti-terrorism legislation.150 Due to this deference, Declarations of Incom-
patibility are also important for an analysis of the British government. 
c.  The Impact of the European Court of Human Rights 
The United Kingdom’s new separation of powers is complicated by the 
influence of the European Court of Human Rights. The European Court of 
Human Rights remains a powerful influence over the British judiciary.151 
Because of the European Convention on Human Rights’ treaty status, the 
European Court of Human Rights is the only court that can directly force 
the executive to change its laws,152 which makes it more powerful than the 
British judiciary.153 Even though British citizens may now bring human 
rights claims before British courts, British citizens still bring cases to the 
European Court of Human Rights every year. In fact, in 2011 alone, the 
European Court of Human Rights considered 1553 applications that had 
been lodged against the United Kingdom.154  
The European Court of Human Rights also directly influences the British 
judiciary. Per Human Rights Act Section 2, British courts are now required 
to “take account” of relevant European Convention on Human Rights 
jurisprudence, which includes decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights and the European Commission and Committee of Ministers.155 
However, it is unclear what “taking account” of European Court of Human 
Rights jurisprudence means. The British judges also appear to disagree with 
each other (and sometimes with themselves) about what Section 2 requires. 
Some judges believe that “domestic courts and tribunals should, in the 
absence of special circumstances, follow the clear and constant 
  
 149. See Liberty & JUSTICE, Liberty and JUSTICE submission to the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee: Response to the United Kingdom’s Sixth Periodic Report Under 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, (Oct. 2007), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ 
ngos/liberty_justice_UK93.pdf. 
 150. See generally Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2 (Eng.).  
 151. Alyssa King, A Supreme Court, Supreme Parliament, and Transnational 
National Rights, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 245, 246 (2010). 
 152. The executive has said that it will follow European Court of Human Rights 
rulings. JOINT COMM. ON HUM. RTS., SIXTEENTH REPORT, supra note 77, at 46, 49.  
 153. Id.  
 154. The Eur. Ct. H.R., In Facts and Figures 2011, ECHR.COE.INT, 10 (Jan. 2012), 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/C99DDB86-EB23-4E12-BCDA-D19B63A935AD/0/ 
FAITS_CHIFFRES_EN_JAN2012_VERSION_WEB.pdf. Of these applications, only thirty 
cases against the UK were declared viable for a judicial opinion and only eight were decided 
against the UK. Id. 
 155. If the court fails to do so, it is arguably in violation, as a “public authority,” of 
Section 6 of the Human Rights Act. 
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jurisprudence of that court.”156 On the other end of the spectrum, some 
judges appear to almost completely disregard relevant European Court of 
Human Rights cases and even fail to mention these cases in their 
opinions.157 Still other judges engage in strategic behavior with regard to 
European Court of Human Rights case law: they take note of it and follow it 
only when it agrees with the outcome they prefer.158  
Overall, the British judges overwhelmingly follow European Court of 
Human Rights cases.159 Some judges’ strict adherence to European Court of 
Human Rights jurisprudence, despite their requirement to only “take into 
account” these cases, may be the result of the judges’ fear that the European 
Court of Human Rights will overturn any British court decision contrary to 
its own case law.160 At least one Supreme Court justice, Lord Slynn, has 
specifically indicated that this concern motivates his adherence to European 
Court of Human Rights case law.161 Therefore, due to the European Court of 
Human Rights’ influence, the judiciary will probably be less willing to 
compromise with the other branches if the judiciary’s decision is supported 
by the European Court of Human Rights.  
Despite its limited powers under the British constitution, by using the 
United Kingdom’s treaty obligations under the European Convention on 
Human Rights, the British judiciary can force the other branches to defer to 
its decisions that implicate human rights. However, European Court of 
Human Rights cases can hinder the British judiciary as well. The British 
judiciary may go beyond European Court of Human Rights cases and rule a 
statute incompatible even if it does not believe that the European Court of 
  
 156. Huang v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2007] UKHL 11, [18], [2007] 2 
A.C. 167 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). See also R v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 
[2002] UKHL 46, [18], [2003] A.C. 837 (H.L.) (Lord Bingham of Cornhill) (appeal taken 
from Eng.). 
 157. See Attorney General’s Reference (No. 2 of 2001), [2003] UKHL 68, [118-119], 
[2004] 2 A.C. 72 (H.L.) (Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 158. See S. K. Martens, Incorporating the European Convention: The Role of the 
Judiciary, EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 5, 13 (1998). For example, in Alconbury, Lord Hoffman 
stated that he would not have followed the European Court of Human Rights cases if they 
had not agreed with his decision of how the case should be resolved. R (Alconbury 
Developments Ltd.) v. Sec’y of State for the Env’t, Transp., and the Regions, [2001] UKHL 
23, [74]-[76] (Lord Hoffman) (Eng.). In other cases, British judges have explicitly departed 
from European Court of Human Rights cases because they did not agree with its holdings. 
Ghaidan, [2002] ECWA (Civ) 1533, [24] (Buxton L.J.) (Eng.). 
 159. Elizabeth Wicks, Taking Account of Strasbourg? The British Judiciary’s 
Approach To Interpreting Convention Rights, 11 EUR. PUB. L. 405, 410 (2005). 
 160. Id. at 412; R (Anderson), [2002] UKHL 46. However, the European Court of 
Human Rights does give some deference to national governments under its doctrine of the 
“margin of appreciation.” The “margin of appreciation” is the deference the European Court 
of Human Rights gives a nation to determine how to comply with the European Court of 
Human Rights. Hatton v. United Kingdom, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. 565, [129] (2002). Accordingly, 
if the issue is new or there is not much case law, there is a chance that the European Court of 
Human Rights will defer to the British judiciary or executive on the issue. 
 161. R (Alconbury), [2001] UKHL 23, [31] (Lord Slynn).  
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Human Rights will agree.162 However, the judiciary is less likely to do so 
because it knows that the executive can ignore its declaration if the 
European Court of Human Rights does not agree.  
Because the British executive is required to follow the European Court of 
Human Rights,163 the executive has a greater incentive to make sure that its 
laws conform to the European Court of Human Rights’ preferences, and it 
can do so at the expense of the British judiciary’s preferences. For example, 
if a statute is close enough to the European Court of Human Rights’ 
preference, the executive can safely ignore the British judiciary’s 
Declaration of Incompatibility because if the plaintiff brings his or her case 
to the European Court of Human Rights, the statute will be upheld. On the 
other hand, if the European Court of Human Rights agrees with the British 
judiciary, it is likely that the executive will pass new or remedial legislation.  
The European Court of Human Rights therefore represents a transaction 
cost, which will make it less likely that the executive or legislature will 
attempt to overrule a judicial decision with European Court of Human 
Rights backing. Both the judiciary and executive must consider the 
European Court of Human Rights’ preferences when strategizing with each 
other. European Court of Human Rights cases that favor the British 
judiciary will make it harder for the executive to override the British 
judiciary and, thus, less likely that the executive will attempt to do so. 
d.  Deference to Parliament 
Despite the British judiciary’s new powers, deference is still an issue. 
Even when judges have reinterpreted a statute, they have done so with 
language that is highly deferential to Parliament’s intent.164 The Joint 
Committee on Human Rights has also criticized the courts for overly 
restricting the Human Rights Act’s application and thereby failing to ensure 
that Convention rights are as widely applicable in domestic law as the 
  
 162. There are a few cases where it has done so. See Brice Dickson, Safe in Their 
Hands? Britain’s Law Lords and Human Rights, 26 LEGAL STUD. 329, 335 (2006). 
 163. McGoldrick, supra note 32, at 924; see JOINT COMM. ON HUM. RTS., SIXTEENTH 
REPORT, supra note 77.  
 164. Int’l Transp. Roth GmbH, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 158, [184], [2003] Q.B. 728 
(Parker L.J.) (Eng.) (“[I]n my judgment it would involve rewriting the scheme to an 
unacceptable extent, given the high degree of ‘deference’ which ought to be accorded to 
Parliament.”); Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council, [2002] EWHC (Admin) 195, [2003] 
Q.B. 151, [187] (Laws L.J.) (Eng.) (“[T]he courts (in interpreting statutes and, now, applying 
the Human Rights Act 1998) will pay more or less deference to the legislature, or other 
public decision-maker, according to the subject in hand.”); R v. A, [2001] UKHL 25, [2002] 
A.C. 45 (Lord Slynn of Hadley) (appeal taken from Eng.) (“[I]t is appropriate in some 
circumstances for the judiciary to defer, on democratic grounds, to the considered opinion of 
the elected body as to where the balance is to be struck between the rights of the individual 
and the needs of society.”). See also Kavanagh, The Role of Parliamentary Intention in 
Adjudication Under the Human Rights Act 1998, supra note 97, at 193. 
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European Convention on Human Rights requires.165 As recently as 2006, the 
European Court of Human Rights has found European Convention on 
Human Rights violations where the Supreme Court justices believed there 
were none.166  
The judiciary’s continuing deference to Parliament cuts to the heart of 
the primary purpose of the Human Rights Act, as well as the judiciary’s 
ability to effectively strategize against the other branches. The judiciary’s 
reluctance to use its new powers under the Human Rights Act may cause the 
other branches of government to disregard the judiciary’s preferences when 
drafting policies that may have human rights implications. Without the 
threat of judicial interference, either through interpretation or Declarations 
of Incompatibility, a real fear exists that the legislature and executive will 
not adequately ensure the protection of human rights when other pressing 
needs appear to outweigh such concerns.167  
However, there is evidence that the judiciary has begun to lessen its 
deference and adopt a more activist role with regards to human rights law. 
For example, courts have articulated that it is up to the courts to determine 
whether a claimant’s Human Rights Act rights have been infringed upon, as 
well as whether the executive’s act was proportionate.168 A recent House of 
Lords case, Re P, [2008] UKHL 38, has also shown that the Law Lords will 
not defer to the executive even if the European Court of Human Rights 
would.  
With or without deference to Parliament, the judiciary clearly engages in 
strategizing with the other government branches. The Human Rights Act 
has created a middle ground, giving the British judiciary increased powers 
of interpretation and the power to issue Declarations of Incompatibility, but 
still prohibiting it from striking primary legislation. Using these powers, the 
courts must still anticipate the preferences of Parliament, the executive, and 
the European Court of Human Rights. In turn, the executive and legislature 
  
 165. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE MEANING OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 
UNDER THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT, SEVENTH REPORT, 2003-4, H.L 39, H.C. 382, ¶ 41. (U.K.). 
Deference has caused judges to refuse to substantially reinterpret statutes and to side with the 
executive or Parliament on many controversial issues. Jeffrey Jowell, Judicial Deference: 
Servility, Civility or Institutional Capacity? PUB. L. 592, 599 (2003); IAN LEIGH, Concluding 
Remarks in JUDICIAL REASONING UNDER THE UK HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 432 (Helen Fenwick et 
al. eds. 2007). But see Huang, [2007] UKHL 11, [16] (Lord Bingham) (Supreme Court 
justifying its deference to the executive). 
 166. Wainwright v. United Kingdom, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. 40 (2007); Wainwright v. 
Home Office, [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 A.C. 406 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.); JOINT 
COMM. ON HUM. RTS., SIXTEENTH REPORT, supra note 77, at [41]-[42]. See also Dickson, 
supra note 162, at 340 n.77. 
 167. Edwards, supra note 146, at 868 (quoting Iacobucci J. in Vriend v. Alberta, 
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 495, [139] (Can.)). Justice Iacobucci’s statement was later quoted by Lord 
Justice Laws in Int’l Transp. Roth GmbH, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 158, [72], [2003] Q.B. 728 
(appeal taken from Eng.). 
 168. Belfast City Council, [2007] UKHL 19 [31], [37] (Baroness Hale of Richmond), 
[88] (Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury). 
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now have to anticipate the judiciary’s reaction to legislation that impacts 
human rights, particularly if the judiciary has the backing of the European 
Court of Human Rights. When Parliament, the executive, and the legislature 
work together, it results in the creation or alteration of laws, similar to what 
is seen in the United States.  
II. CHARTS 
The effects of the different government structures and styles can be seen 
more easily through the use of charts. Theorists commonly use charts and 
models to explain and predict government behavior. In this article, charts 
will be used to show that the British government branches’ policy goals and 
the utility of altering legislation to implement those goals may dictate those 
branches’ behavior. As the charts below show, a branch’s utility will change 
in response to the other branches’ preferences and strategies.  
The following charts carry several assumptions. First, because the 
executive branch still (for the most part) dominates Parliament through 
party control, the legislature and executive’s interests are assumed to be the 
same. Limiting the charts to two dimensions also makes them easier to work 
with. Second, the judiciary and legislature/executive are presumed to be in 
conflict. More specifically, the judiciary is the first player in these charts 
and wants the law to change in line with its policy preferences. The 
legislature/executive wants the law to remain the same. Moreover, the 
judiciary is aware that the legislature/executive may override169 any 
decision that strays too far from the legislature/executive’s preferences.  
Finally, the judiciary is also aware of the Human Rights Act’s 
unpopularity with the public, who consider it a “villains’ charter” that helps 
the undeserving.170 Similarly, British citizens are suspicious of the judiciary 
having too much power because they see the judiciary as elitist and 
undemocratic compared to Parliament.171 For that reason, when British 
judges use the Human Rights Act, they open themselves and the Human 
Rights Act up to further criticism. Potential criticism is particularly 
problematic for the Human Rights Act because it is a controversial statute 
and, although it has constitutional implications, it can be repealed by a 
majority vote in Parliament, the same as any other statute.172 
  
 169. A legislative override has been defined as Congress consciously overruling, 
modifying the result, or modifying the consequences of a judicial decision through 
subsequent legislation. Eskridge, supra note 102, at 332 n.1. 
 170. Sweeny, supra note 35, at 80. 
 171. Id. at 77-78. 
 172. Id. at 40. 
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A. Chart 1—Judge’s Attitudes 
In the first scenario, the hypothetical judge is unhappy with the status 
quo of a law. The more she can change the law, the happier she is. This 
chart shows both a strategic judge in an unconstrained environment (the 
judge has no fear of legislative reactions) and a non-strategic judge who 
does not try to advance her policy goals when making judicial decisions. As 
shown by the chart, the strategic judge gains more utility the more her deci-
sion changes the existing law. The non-strategic judge, in contrast, derives 
no utility from changing the existing law. 
 
B. Chart 2—Adding the Legislature/Executive’s Preferences 
Chart 2 shows the British legislature/executive’s desire to override the 
judge’s decision. For both “normal” statutes and statutes that affect human 
rights, the legislature/executive’s utility in overriding a judicial decision 
will vary depending on the override’s transaction costs. In other words, the 
judge’s decision has to be far enough away from the status quo for the 
legislature to bother with expending the time and effort necessary to draft 
new legislation and send it to Parliament for a vote.173 This chart also shows 
that the legislature/executive will let the judiciary make larger changes to 
existing human rights legislation. However, these branches will also have a 
stronger reaction if the judiciary goes too far.  
This variance in the legislature/executive’s reactions is the result of the 
impact of the European Court of Human Rights and the HRA itself. Because 
the European Court of Human Rights can strike legislation that violates the 
ECHR, the legislature/executive have increased transaction costs when they 
attempt to override judicial decisions in that area, particularly if the 
judiciary defers to prior European Court of Human Rights decisions (which 
  
 173. Rogers, supra note 1, at 88. 
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it often does). Specifically, the legislature/executive risks a case being 
brought to the European Court of Human Rights, having to defend itself 
before the European Court of Human Rights, and risking the embarrassment 
of the European Court of Human Rights, ruling the new statute 
incompatible with the ECHR. On the other hand, the Human Rights Act is 
controversial, so the legislature/executive are likely to have a stronger 
reaction to the judiciary pushing human rights laws too far. 
 
 
C. Chart 3—Judiciary’s Awareness of Potential Override 
Chart 3 shows the judiciary’s calculation of how far it is willing to 
deviate from the status quo knowing that, at a certain point,174 the legislature 
will override its decision. This chart is limited to the judiciary’s calculations 
for statutes without human rights implications. The calculations of the 
British judiciary will be similar to those of the American judiciary, but the 
British judiciary must also anticipate the reality that the executive, due to its 
party control over Parliament, will find re-legislating much easier than 
Congress would. The British judiciary therefore has much more reason to be 
conservative in its interpretations, especially considering the British 
judiciary’s historical deference and role perceptions. This model shows that, 
because of its fear of an override, the judiciary will not differ too far from 
the existing legislation, because if that decision is overridden, the judiciary 
will achieve less or even zero utility overall. 
  
 174. It is possible to create equillibria for a situation of complete legislative 
domination where the legislature would override any judicial decision with which does not 
agree. Id. at 92. This chart assumes, however, that, due to transaction costs, there is always a 
point where the legislature/executive will not bother to override a judicial decision. Id.  
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D. Chart 4—Judiciary’s Strategies 
Chart 4 compares judicial strategies for typical statutory construction 
with strategies for statutes that affect human rights. As seen in Chart 2, 
legislative utilities will differ depending on the type of legislation the 
judiciary is considering. If the ECHR is implicated, the British judiciary has 
more power to interfere with legislation, and the legislature/executive will 
be less likely to re-legislate and risk the displeasure of the European Court 
of Human Rights. Knowing that they have the support of the European 
Court of Human Rights, judges are willing to deviate further from the status 
quo for legislation that impacts human rights.  
However, due to the legislature/executive’s predicted negative reaction 
to expanding the Human Rights Act’s influence too far, the judiciary may 
encounter negative utility if its human rights decision is overridden. As 
noted above, the Human Rights Act is controversial and vulnerable, so a 
false step will mean higher consequences for the judge and the Human 
Rights Act itself. Indeed, by pushing its own policy preferences too far, the 
British judiciary risks the executive/legislature using the Human Rights 
Act’s lack of constitutional status to repeal the Human Rights Act.175 
  
 175. Indeed, the Conservative Party is still calling for its repeal. Brendan Carlin, Tory 
Donors Tell Cameron to Create True Blue Cabinet, DAILY MAIL, July 29, 2012. 
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Taken together, these charts show that the British government branches 
interact strategically—much like the American government branches—but 
with some differences. Unlike in the United States, the subject matter of a 
law can drastically change the relative powers and strategies of the British 
government branches. When reviewing legislation that impacts human 
rights, British judges, despite their inability to strike statutes and cultural 
deference to Parliament, can still push their policy preferences. Judging by 
some Ministerial statements, it seems clear that legislative and executive 
branches are very aware of the power of the judiciary with regards to human 
rights, which indicates that human rights issues do alter their behavior 
without the judiciary actually having to intervene.176  
Further, due to the inherent interconnectedness between the British 
government branches, they are likely to have better information exchanges, 
which will lead to better predictions regarding how a branch will react to a 
new law. Indeed, there is much evidence that the British government 
branches do informally communicate, particularly where legislation raises 
  
 176. For example, Tessa Jowell, in response to questioning about the failure to make a 
statement of compatibility for the Communications Bill 2002, acknowledged that if the Bill 
were found to be incompatible in domestic courts, “we would need to reconsider our 
position.” 395 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2002) 789 (U.K.). 
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human rights concerns.177 Accordingly, these charts, although simplified, 
shed light on how the British government branches strategize with each 
other when creating law. 
CONCLUSION 
As a consequence of recent constitutional reform legislation, particularly 
the Human Rights Act, the British government’s structure has shifted 
repeatedly over the past few years. More specifically, the Human Rights Act 
has created a more independent judiciary with new powers to interpret and 
even strike legislation that more closely resemble the powers of the 
American judiciary.  
The Human Rights Act has also changed how the judiciary sees its role in 
the government. Judges are no longer limiting themselves to reading the 
statutory text and “announcing” what Parliament intended. They are now 
actively interpreting statutes and coming to conclusions that are sometimes 
unexpected and undesired by Parliament and the executive. These changes, 
if not bringing the British government closer to the American government 
culture, make the British government more transparent and, therefore, easier 
to study. Moreover, at least in the area of human rights law, it is now 
possible to see the judiciary strategize with the other branches. 
The Human Rights Act has also shifted some power away from the 
executive to the legislature through the JCHR, which has created greater 
transparency and a structure that is closer to the American system of checks 
and balances. For example, because the Human Rights Act requires that the 
government branches communicate and interact in a structured and official 
framework, scholars can use the data created by this framework to 
formulate testable hypotheses about how the three branches (now more 
separate and independent) work together (or not) to create laws. 
Accordingly, through these recent constitutional changes, the differences 
between the two countries’ governments have been reduced to the point 
where scholars in both countries can now discover the strategies the British 
government branches use when creating law.  
The brief analysis above shows that the three branches of government in 
the United States and the United Kingdom influence the way in which the 
other branches act. However, future research is still necessary to show 
whether political strategizing can fully account for the creation of law in the 
United Kingdom. Although political strategizing does provide some 
explanation for the interactions among the government branches (and the 
  
 177. Oliver, Constitutional Scrutiny of Executive Bills, supra note 80, at 43; Feldman, 
Injecting Law into Politics and Politics into Law, supra note 88, at 117; Feldman, Impact of 
Human Rights, supra note 88, at 91; Hiebert, Parliament and the Human Rights Act: Can the 
JCHR Help Facilitate a Culture of Rights?, supra note 74, at 24. There is evidence that there 
is also some informal communication between Congress and the judiciary. Milligan, 
Congressional End-Run: The Ignored Constraint on Judicial Review, supra note 6, at 247. 
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European Court of Human Rights), the United Kingdom’s history has 
created a different political culture that must still be considered. Remaining 
issues of judicial deference and executive dominance over Parliament 
should be added to any future analysis of the United Kingdom in order to 
capture a full explanation of how law is created there.  
 

